Error of my ways

Today, I, a beleaguered Astros fan, type with my head bowed, and with a heart full of regret. Yesterday I wrote some very unkind words about the General Manager of the Houston Astros, Edward Wade. As a passionate fan, I wanted the very best for my favorite baseball club, and when I felt the team was headed in the wrong direction, I spoke out. Rashly. Too rashly. Coming into this week I thought, (although some would say you need a brain to think, something that is still in doubt)that given our present place in the standings, perhaps it would be prudent to move a number of our veteran players for a few minor leaguers. Ya know, building blocks, stepping stones to a new generation of Astros baseball. How wrong I was. Red Sox send in a scout to take a look at some of our relievers, possibly even Miguel Tejada?? Rebuffed! And rightfully so- tell them to go jump in the Charles River. We don't need prospects from the team that has built two World Series Champions on the strength of their minor league system. Youkilis. Papelbon. Ellsbury. Lester. Lowrie. Moss. Masterson. Pedroia. Buchholz. Yea, well..I'll see that, and raise you: Pence. Towl..no, wait Hunter Pence. Ummm...Etc. Take a deep breath. Going through the names of players produced by our minor league teams can be both exhausting and exhilerating. Ready to go on? Ok. Sure, we didn't get any young talent, and sure, this club ages by the day- but so do younger teams like the Red Sox. It's true. Everyone ages at the same rate. Don't believe me- here, stuff this prediction in your hookah and then smoke it: At 9:53 AM on Saturday, August 2, 2008 we will all be exactly one day older. I shit you not. Same goes for Major Leaguers. I won't even limit it to the Red Sox and Astros: Ryan Braun, Ian Kinsler, Tim Lincecum- all will be one day older tomorrow. So will Doug Brocail. Ditto Darin Erstad. See where I'm going with this?? The Astros' complete disregard for young players is well founded.

At this point, Ed Wade has turned the baseball universe on its head and spun it like a top. You'd think that would be enough for one man to accomplish in a week's time. But not ol' Eddie. Nosiree. He's scheming. Planning.

What is he planning, you may ask? Maybe somebody should send Ed a text telling him that this isn't like the NBA draft lottery- we don't have a shot at getting the first pick in the draft unless we have the worst record. And unless these personnel moves were made in order for us to los....oh, Ed, you're good, you're good. I seemed to have discovered another plan of Ed's: for us to leapfrog (backwards leapfrog to be exact) the Washington Nationals/Seattle Mariners for the worst record in baseball. Be that as it may, let's take a look at his deadline moves. Therein lies his true plan. A pattern quickly comes into focus:

Alberto Arias claimed off waivers from Colorado

LaTroy Hawkins obtained in exchange for minor league second baseman Matt Cusick

What did Ed do last offseason? Revamped our bullpen. Added a number of guys who can fill multiple roles in our relief corps. Do you see what's devloping here??

Peer into the looking glass, people

It's been fairly obvious to some that Ed's been trying to be cutting edge this entire time. His recent trades prove that. He understands that it is both more cost effective and talent effective to have four starters and have his relief pitchers start the fifth game in the rotation. Call us prophetic, call us soothsayers, call us visionaries. Now Ed has wisened up. I was dumb for not seeing the writing on the wall, when I lambasted him. I'm sorry, Mr. Wade. Truly. Sorry.

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Fear and Loathing in Houston

Evan here: Well the clock is ticking on Ed Wade making a trade to improve the Astros. With every movement of the minute hand, the fate of the Houston Astros for seasons to come becomes more and more apparent. There will be no moves to better this team down the line. There are 23 minutes left. Don't hold your breath. Put down the rabbit's foot. After winning 4 out of 6 games against divisional opponents, our chips are on the table- and we're goin' all in. Don't mistake this bravado for baseball intelligence. No, no- the Houston Astros of 2008 are not "stupid like a fox". They're most likely just, well, stupid. I hate to say it, because you won't find a bigger Astros fan than me. Or any of us, for that matter. We've all thought the same thing today- why can't Drayton see this team for what it is?? (20 minutes)How can he miss the forest for the trees? My answer is this: sometimes, those closest to the situation can't see the problem around them, no matter how evident. If you go to a friend's house, and all their family does is fight- you can leave thinking, "well, if Person A did this and if Person B did that and if Person C didn't do that the family could be a lot more cohesive." (19 minutes) We can scream until our lungs burst with frustration, but this is just how the current team braintrust is going to operate. To some extent I give them credit- they all want to win. Their avenues for arriving at the ultimate destination need to be seriously reconsidered, but their hearts are in the right place. Their minds however, need to be reconfigured. (17 minutes)


Let me preface this by saying that I defended Ed Wade's off-season moves until I was blue in the face this off-season. My logic was that should we try and fail this year, at least we had acquired/possessed a ton of tradeable pieces to re-stock and re-build at the trade deadline (which is fast approaching). Evan's and I's conviction in the fact that something like this would happen is what led us to picking up the blog again for this season. What follows is four three months worth of frustration and attempting to find a silver-lining in the cluster-f@*k of a season this has been only to continually just be shat on by our management.

The Astros acquired LaTroy Hawkins last night. It's a low risk move if you don't analyze it because Hawkins will be almost free to the Astros (we can pretend that this is not because the Yankees are just that pleased to get rid of him). However, to acquire Hawkins, we gave up Matthew Cusick who in 573 career AB at A ball has this triple slash: .293/.383/.455. Those numbers look good for a 10th rounder. Granted it's A ball, but at this point possessing someone who has upside in our farm system is like striking oil. LaTroy Hawkins was so bad as a Yankees reliever they released him. Outside of Mariano and Joba, try to name a Yankees reliever who isn't awful...that's HOW bad LaTroy Hawkins was this year so far. His control is terrible 5.1 K/9 to 3.8 BB/9, which you would expect from a 35 year old relief pitcher who's just never been that good.

Ok, enough of my baseball statistics nerdery. What does Ed Wade have to say about this deal?

On Hawkins' terrible year so far:

His overall numbers don't look all that great right now, but our reports on him over the last month or so, he's gone back and thrown more of his four-seam fastball and his velocity has been good.

Alright Ed. What you're saying is you know he's bad, but now that he's throwing the ball harder, the fact that he can't locate his pitches to not walk people will be ameliorated. Phew.

On giving up a projectible young prospect:

We like Matt. He's swinging the bat very well at Lexington, and he's had a good season down there. I had a chance to see him play a handful of games early in the season. We consider him a prospect, and obviously, the Yankees consider him a prospect also. But if you have a chance to add an experienced guy like Hawkins, and the price of doing business is a lower level bat, then it makes sense to go ahead and do something.

So we have this kid in our farm system who is doing some really outstanding things, but you had a chance to take a guy who is way past his prime (if there was one) in your bull pen. Which, by the way, is already full of decent but not great guys. Good call. It's not like this team isn't chock full of veterans who are declining rapidly in some aspect of the game or other. What the franchise has too much of is is talented young prospects to replace these guys -- hopefully sooner rather than later.

Well then Ed, how do you feel what you've done to help a team who have a negative 56 run differential while being 9.5 games back in the Wild Card race behind a scant six teams (I could have also just written: Have no hope of doing anything meaningful this year)?

We sort of went into this period of time looking to bolster our starting rotation, and get some more depth in the back end of the bullpen, and we think with Randy Wolf and LaTroy Hawkins, we've done those things.

You've added more depth that is for sure. You've also added a pitcher who's numbers are park inflated, and a reliever who is losing his ability to pitch effectively. In the process you've given up a pitcher who many thought would be the next Dan Wheeler and a A ball guy who was playing very, very well. This would possibly be excusable if the following things weren't true:

1. Our Starting Rotation would actually be improved by Randy Wolf.

2. Our Bull Pen would actually be improved by LaTroy Hawkins.

3. 1 and 2 would only be legitimate if the following weren't true:

A. This team weren't in the bottom of the league for .OBP and had prospects for increasing its run scored.

B. This team weren't buried in the basement of the NL Central by 13.5 games and the Wild Card by 9.5 games and six other teams.

4. If 3(A) and 4(B) are true, the logical plan would be to unload the movable and valuable talent on this team for as many talent prospects as possible, in an effort to make this Matt Cusick kid look like a schmuck in our farm system.

At this point, I feel inclined almost to root against the Astros, so that Ed Wade might get splashed with a painful and shocking dose of reality. So that we might have a front office rebuilding process and then further down the line a team rebuilding process -- once the front office is qualified (read: not lobotomized) to take on such an endeavor.

I just checked MLBTradeRumors to see if Ed Wade has just been playing the fool and suddenly sent an email to every GM listing his terms for Wandy, Miggy, Wiggy, the Bench Crew, Valverde, Brocail, and Geary in what would be forever considered one the saaviest moves ever to drive up demand elasticity for our guys...there was no such news. Damnit.

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Baseball Knowledge 101: DIPS > ERA

While the final hours before the trade deadline slip away and the Astros continue to put their head in the sand (believing that acquiring Randy Wolf and LaTroy Hawkins makes us a play off contending team), instead of restocking the farm by selling everything they can, you can sit back and dig into the how's and why's of DIPS. You'll also learn why Tim Purpura is just a total idiot.

When we last checked in on pitching, we ran you through the how’s and why’s of ERA’s deficiencies. Evan had the harder of our two tasks in breaking down ERA vs. explaining DIPS. It’s easy to explain how DIPS works and why it is that their measures most accurately capture the true skill level of a pitcher’s performance through it’s methodology, but it’s incredibly difficult to explain why ERA is a faulty statistic in general, because there so many variables that are captured by ERA that are irrelevant (scorer bias) and luck dependent (LD%, HR/FB%, etc.). Today, I will try and bring you deeper into what I consider sabermetrics most valuable contribution to baseball: defense independent metrics (defense independent pitching, luck independent pitching, and fielding independent pitching). For reasons hopefully to explicated clearly below, these metrics all do a far better job of capturing the true skill and performance of a pitcher than ERA, W-L, single rate stats (K/9, BB/9, WHIP, etc.), or even the aforementioned Support-Neutral family of statistics. While rate stats (except for WHIP) accurately gage a singular skill of a pitcher, they don’t tell us about his entire skill set. ERA and W-L, as previously discussed, are poor, to down right awful, at gauging a pitcher’s skill level. Even the Support-Neutral family of statistics is still hampered by many of the same things that ERA is, because while it gives a better feel for how a single pitching performance by a pitcher helped his team stay in a game to win it, it can’t tell us whether that pitching performance was strong or weak based on the pitcher’s ability or a the variety of randomly varying factors that impact a pitching performance.

As alluded to by Evan, the vein of pitching-analysis we’re venturing down today was inspired by the BABIP/ERA phenomenon, first observed by Voros McCracken. In his original article on DIPS, Voros surmised that, “there is little if any difference among major-league pitchers in their ability to prevent hits on balls hit in the field of play." This bold statement has since been heavily amended, but can be restated as something akin to: Major-league pitchers have little control over their ability to prevent line-drives which heavily affects their BABIP, where as they show a significant ability to control GB, IF, and FB, they however show little ability to control the outcome of any batted-ball. I know that just took out 3/4 of the kinds of balls in play and then reassigned them to the pitcher’s responsibility category. Which given our treatment of BABIP last time seems either counter-intuitive or like we were lying. Hopefully I’ll be able to clear it up.

When originally proposed by Voros the first time, he labeled the following pitching categories defense independent:

BB K HBP IBB HR

Those are all categories which are truly defense independent statistics as only the pitcher can cause/allow them to occur. The first incarnation of DIPS worked by finding the rate at which these statistics occurred for a pitcher and then subtracting out how many batters faced would have walked, struck out, been hit, intentionally walked, or homered from the total number of batters faced. From there he broke down singles, doubles, triples, and outs for each pitcher and set the rate at which these occurred to the league average BABIP. He did this because, prior to further investigation by many different analysts, it seemed like BABIP truly was out of the pitcher’s control entirely. What he had left was the number of BB, K, HBP, HR, IBB, 1B, 2B, 3B, and outs for a pitcher that would have occurred all things equal. With that he assigned each event a run value (what they were, I’m not sure, but I imagine it was the standard BaseRuns) to then calculate the number of Runs Allowed by a pitcher with the new numbers. This would result in a DIPS ERA, which could really be thought of as a DIPS RAA (runs allowed average). The measurement is still somewhat valuable as a quick way to see whether an extreme ERA is valid or not and is now cited as FIP (fielding independent pitching).

Understandably this was controversial, because conventional baseball wisdom assumed pitchers could control hits allowed. In order to prove/disprove Voros’ assertion, the last seven years has seen a tremendous amount of research go into DIPS. The results have yielded a more nuanced understanding of the batter/pitcher match-up and the subsequent dividing line between pitching and defense.

As up to date as I have seen it, here is how DIPS is calculated to reflect the more nuanced truth that has come to light since Voros’ original proposition of BABIP as pure chance.

A pitcher is assigned a league average LD%, reflecting that statistically LD’s are uncontrollable according to year to year correlations (Source). This luck-less amount of line-drives are then subtracted from the pitchers’ number of batted-balls. Next, the rate at which a pitcher surrendered Ground balls, Infield-flies (IF), Outfield-flies (OF), and bunts. Then, to correct for the role that defense plays in each of the kinds of batted balls, league average results are applied to them. So if 30 of GB% fall singles and the pitcher in question, after the adjustments, was given 100 GB’s, then he’d be credited for 30 singles. The resulting 70 would have the same thing done for 2B, 3B, HR, outs, double plays, and reached on error (ROE). The same for his adjusted number of LD, IF, OF, and bunts. With the pitcher’s new line of corrected K’s, BB’s, IBB’s, HBP, 1B, 2B, 3B, HR, ROE, and outs, a defense independent Runs Allowed is then calculated by assigning a run value to each event via BaseRuns. This methodology is DIPS 3.0.

The question that remains (if you’re still even reading) is why is it valid to count LD% as luck, but GB% and IF% and OF% as pitching skill? To this end, I will stick with Mitchel Litchman’s study of the year to year correlation of differnt types of balls in play to bolster DIPS 3.0’s methodology. Litchman studied pitchers, over a 10 year period (1993-2002), who changed teams to study their batted-ball data. Why those who changed teams? In Litchman’s words it is so “we have essentially removed the home park and defensive influences from the correlations.” His study involved over 100 pitchers who had a minimum of 300 balls in play in the consecutive seasons -- a large sample size to say the least. He than ran the year to year correlation on the different kinds of batted balls. His results indicated that pitchers show absolutely no control over LD’s, but exhibited a good degree of consistency (i.e. control) in IF, OF, and GB (each factor was listed from least amount of control to strongest.

So hopefully that clears up why it is that when we calculate a DIPS, the LD% is automatically league average, and then the pitchers own individual rate of surrendering IF, OF, and GB is left alone. However there is one issue that probably is still lingering in your mind. If GB, IF, and OF are under the control of a pitcher then why does DIPS 3.0 then assign league average rates of results to each batted-ball type (i.e. Why say if a GB goes for a single a league average 57% of the time and a pitcher surrendered 100 GB, therefore 57 defense independent GB singles, instead of however many singles he actually surrendered on GB?)? Again, we have to look back to Litchman who determined through the same study I’ve already discussed, that while pitchers show the ability to control what kinds of batted balls they allow, they show almost no control over the rate at which those balls in play go for outs. If pitchers cannot control the rate at which their batted balls go for outs, then they cannot reasonably be expected to control the outcome of the balls in play that do not go for outs. Thus, DIPS 3.0 corrects that.

Alright, we’ve come a long way. What we’ve covered so far, is that from the initial assertion that BABIP is completely a factor of luck (that the only pitcher/batter outcomes a pitcher determines is BB, K, IBB, and HBP), further research revealed that pitchers can control the kinds of balls in play they allow, just not there outcomes. I wouldn’t doubt that you’re wondering: “What the hell does that even mean, aren’t you saying the same thing which just some qualifiers?” Ok, probably not thinking that, but I did. While the outcome of batted balls are out of a pitcher’s hands, except for line-drives they can control the type of ball put in play. Since certain kinds of batted balls go for differing levels of hits/outs more often than others, pitcher’s can -- in a sense -- control their destinies. All they can do however is increase or decrease the probability that ball in play goes for an out, because (as I noted earlier) Litchman’s work indicates that increasing or decreasing outs on balls in play is not a skill pitcher’s possess. Instead, it is one that the defense backing him possess. Thus, DIPS corrects the outcomes of batted-ball types to league average, in order to neutralize the role that defense plays in a pitcher’s skill domain.

What DIPS leaves a GM, Manager, Scout, Fantasy Baseball Player, or Fan with is a metric that captures the actual skill level of the pitcher. It has been adjusted to remove luck and the abilities of others from obscuring the work of a pitcher. How can we be sure of this? Because, DIPS 3.0 has a correlation of .8 with the next year’s ERA, where as ERA has a year-to-year correlation of .374 with itself. A word of caution to DIPS in any shape or form is that they are not an explanatory stat unless you dig deeper into to why there is a differential between ERA and DIPS. Although it is a predictive stat, it is only truly useful at predicting pitchers ERA given the proper context for their DIPS-ERA differential. Things like injuries, command problems, or poor pitch sequencing can all serve to artificially skew the DIPS-ERA differential while not being the result of chance. On the whole though, looking at pitcher’s with positive DIPS-ERA differentials portends to poor future performance. One $120 million oversight by an organization refusing to employ sabermetric analysis in player evaluation is the infamous Barry Zito. In his contract year, Zito posted a 3.83 ERA, but it was deflated largely due to a ridiculous 78.5% LOB%, which was reflect in his 4.65 DIPS. Brian Sabean could and should have easily been able to observe that Zito’s continued success depended on strong defense, as both his IF% had fell of the table as well as a steadily decling K/9, and that such a pitcher, no matter his past performance levels, does not warrant a $120 million contract.

Now before Astros fans start ridiculing the Giants, let’s not forget December 2006, when Jason Jennings came to town. Purpura traded for Jennings off the strength of his 2006 3.78 which for Coors Field is probably like saying Roger Clemens had a 1.87 ERA in 2005. However it, like Zito’s ERA, was deflated due to a totally unsustanable HR rate, which is represented in his 2006 DIPS of 4.61. Would anybody else like to have Willy T, Jason Hirsch or Taylor Bucholtz still in light of this? (DIPS 3.0 Source, you have to go to the bottom and open the spread sheet). **Side Note, you could do the exact same thing with Woody Williams, 2006 ERA: 3.65, 2006: DIPS: 5.03...eeesssshhh** It works the other way too, the quickest example I could find was Freddy Garcia from 2004-2005. 2004 saw him post a dismal 4.64 ERA, whereas DIPS 3.0 had him at a 3.54. In 2005, Garcia posted 3.54 ERA. Not too shabby DIPS 3.0.

Ok, that was exhaustive for me and I’m sure for you. We’ll save LIPS for next time and jam it in with pitch/fx, which actually makes a good deal of sense to do. Addendum number two the syllabus should read: “DIPS > ERA” and “The Next Frontier: LIPS and pitch/fx.

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Tingling

**Stephen Chiming In** Hey it could be so that we could unload a bull pen arm for a few top tier prospects...right?  Right?  RIGHT??  God, I hate this organization.

Who else is feeling a push for the pennant?????

Me neither. Of all the ho-hum, predictable moves Ed Wade could've made, this one takes the cake.

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Gut Feeling (Hopefully Wrong)

As I've obsessively checked MLBTradeRumors.com all day today between assignments, I've come to a terrible conclusion. It's a gut instinct, but I also called Adam Dunn's Granny last night, so apparently I'm en fuego(alright, not the hardest thing to do, but hey it impressed and angered several people around me).

Per this Ken Rosenthal Article and quote:

"Trade Miguel Tejada? The Astros, bless their delusional hearts, are thinking quite the opposite. They're buyers, not sellers, pursuing bullpen help even though they're buried in the National League standings...The team's only discussions about Tejada, the source says, involve his long-term position. Tejada, 34, eventually will need to move to third base, but the Astros have a strong third-base prospect at Class AA, Chris Johnson."

in conjunction with this atrocious Richard Justice blog post (honestly, the man cannot possess a spine and still turn this crap out). I'm calling us trading away better than his ERA suggests and future stud reliever/closer, Bud Norris, and now essentially worthless to us because our organization can't think long-term to save it's life, Chris Johnson, plus one of our MLB Bench Crew for a marginal bull pen arm from whatever team will say yes to Ed Wade first. I hope to God I'm wrong, but reading Justice's and Rosenthal's article with five minutes of each other made that snap together in my mind.

Regardless of whether we make such a terrible trade, I think I will forever hold hate in my heart for this fiasco. We have SO many movable pieces that people are interested in. We could truly restock our farm system (not to mention free up some dough on the general ledger) and in a few years have positive things to look forward to for many years to come. Instead, we're going to sign Ben Sheets to a bloated contract -- because he'll finally reach 200 IP on a World Series Championship team and therefore must be ready to be a long-term Ace, thereby jacking up his asking price (and our bidding price) -- so that we can "compete" in 2009. Depression doesn't even begin to describe what I'm feeling right now.

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Trade talk with your breakfast/midnight snack

Update (12:32 AM) Stephen here. Having been in attendance at tonight's game, apparently there are a lot of Astros fans convinced we're still in contention. It's hard to say what is more depressing, that Ed Wade might try to acquire a free-agent reliever (Bud Norris, start packing your bags) or that we'd refuse to trade Geary to the Sawx for whatever they'd offer us from their well tilled farm system. Apparently the fact that we've won some games as of late has made the management and the "Astros Nation" forget that this is a team with a negative (57) run differential on the strength of averaging 4.33 runs per game while allowing 4.88 (Source. Those marginal .57 runs aren't from the bull pen (nor can they be made up from an bull pen acquisition) and Randy Wolf sure isn't going to make up for them either. I'm going to go to bed now and mutter obscenities under my breath.

Update (11:20 pm): Latest update is that the Red Sox have a scout in town for the Reds series, but not to watch Miguel Tejada. Geoff Geary is the more likely source of attention. Doubtful that he's moved, considering how Ed Wade has been actively searching for relief help since last week.

Update (11 pm): False Alarm. Should've known it was too good to be true.

Good morning (or night)!

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Baseball Knowledge 101, cont'd: ERA and Rate Stats

In our last installment, Stephen detailed why a pitcher’s W-L record is not necessarily indicative of their relative merit as a player. Indeed, rare is the case where a pitcher’s record runs parallel to their on field performance. ERA is often cited as a secondary indicator of a pitcher’s value, to be looked at after W-L. True, it is a better barometer of a pitcher’s success than W-L for one big reason: it isolates the performance of just the pitcher in question, not the team as a whole. Whereas entire teams win and lose games, ERA takes the team out of the equation as well as those runs that score due to errors.

Its improvements over W/L record notwithstanding, ERA has its own share of blemishes, the majority of which have to do with the amount of data that is not included in calculating it. To start off with, ERA obviously only takes into account earned runs. This is important because no pitcher, not a starter or reliever, is held accountable for any unearned run. They sort of just fall into a baseball black hole, joining the likes of Derek Bell and Brian L. Hunter, never to be heard from again. The whole point of statistics is to allow baseball teams, fans and any other inquisitive person to take an objective evaluation of a player. The error is a sometimes arbitrarily arrived at number, handed down by an official scorer at the home ballpark (paid and employed by the home team). Already, a small chink in the armor of this venerable stat can be seen. To paraphrase the great Bill James, just think about where all the focus of anyone watching baseball is most of the time: the batter and the pitcher. The official scorer, like the guy spilling Budweiser in front of you at the park, isn’t focusing on how exactly Miguel Tejada has shifted just prior to the pitch in an attempt to get to a ball in play. In mere fractions of a second from batted ball to fielder, the official scorer gets to determine whether the ball in play and the resulting defensive attempt would have customarily resulted in a defensive stop or out. If he says yes, then the pitcher is no longer accountable for that run. Lots of human error is at play in this beloved statistic. Additionally, ERAs in certain ballparks cannot be compared to ERAs in other ballparks (or years). There is a lot of difference between pitch movement, the physical characteristics of the ball, and other factors that make balls in play easier or harder to turn into outs or hits. Further, runs credited to ERA are sometimes scored against the starter, but allowed to score by relief pitchers who weren't “responsible” for them being on in the first place -- meaning that starter had no say in preventing them from scoring, but is being tagged none the less. Finally, sample size makes ERA a less than worthy statistic when comparing a 200 IP starter against a 60 IP closer. These quibbles are of great importance in figuring out a way to analyze a pitcher’s performance.

ERA was created in an attempt to separate defense and pitching. This is one of the reasons why it’s still a semi-useful statistic. With the influx of sabermetricians and statistically minded fans and executives, new ways of evaluating a pitcher’s performance have been developed. Support-Neutral, Defensive-Independent and Fielding-Independent metrics go beyond ERA to give a more in-depth analysis of a pitcher’s performance. By in depth, I mean taking a look at what a pitcher can control, even more than ERA can. Understanding BABIP is a starting point for this. The basic premise is pretty simple, yet is pretty startling for any baseball fan not familiar with sabermetrics. In essence, BABIP (batting average on balls put into play) demonstrates the relative amount of luck that goes into balls in play being converted for outs. Consider that league average BABIP is generally reported to be with .290 and .300 and then take a look at this chart and its reported BABIP for pitchers. It’s all over the place, because even half way through a baseball season, luck hasn’t evened out for everyone.

To create a more concrete link to why ERA is a weak(er) stat because of the impact that BABIP has on it, let's look further at the batter-pitcher match-up. The “action” of a batter-pitcher match-up can be separated into two parts -- the first of which is the act of the pitcher delivering the ball to the hitter. Without a doubt, the pitcher has a great deal of control over this -- what pitch he throws, the velocity, spin, location, and deception are all within his ability to alter. The second part of this interaction begins after the hitter makes contact with the bat. This is the part that both hitter and pitcher have a relatively small impact on- other than as defender and base-runner. What the other 8 fielders do to the hitters’ ball-in play are out of their hands. Before Stephen and I learned about BABIP, we’d often be watching an Astros game where Jack Wilson would hit a little duck-snort over Adam Everett’s head for a single. Half an inning later, Lance Berkman would line out to Adam LaRoche. I’d turn to him and say, “typical Astros luck.” Well, I was partially right- it was obviously bad luck, which deep down I knew wasn’t just an Astros related phenomenon. What I didn’t know what just how much luck went into the batter-pitcher match-up.

So what does BABIP have to do with ERA? Well, ERA measures the runs that a pitcher is responsible for allowing to score. However, if a pitcher has very weak control over everything in a PA besides K, BB, and HBP, then how valuable of a statistic can it be in accessing the pitcher’s performance? The chart I asked you to click to earlier, which displayed randomly varied BABIPs and it was in an effort to drive home the point that BABIPs vary for really no discernable reason. If balls in play are unluckily landing for hits more often than they should, then we would expect a pitcher’s ERA to suffer disproportionately from his true skill-level or vice-versa if BABIP is extremely low.

Now, there is a heaping amount of gray area that go into saying BABIP is largely luck, but we’ll discuss those intimately in the “DIPS, LIPS, and FIP” next time. These measures seek to determine how well a pitcher pitched in the areas of a pitcher’s performance that they have an inordinate amount of control over: pitch speed, location and homeruns, but we’ll give you a small preview.

Hidden within BABIP are a few characteristics that need be mentioned. Earlier in this post, I attempted to impress upon the fact that BABIP itself is an essentially random statistic. Well, it is, and it isn’t. What is not random about it is the less than a second’s worth of time between the ball leaving the pitcher’s hand before either being hit by the batter, or caught by the catcher. Factors such as where the ball is pitched relative to the strike-zone, how many pitches the pitcher has in his repertoire, and how often the pitcher gets ahead or behind in the count are factors that all pitchers have under their immediate control and these all impact the degree of luck associated with BABIP -- because in the end these afformentioned factors make a pitched ball easier or harder to make solid contact with for the hitter. The further sabmetricians have probed the batted-ball issue, the more they have come to believe that LD% is almost completely a factor of luck. However, buregoning evidence suggests that he can control ground balls, and outfield flys and in-field flys. This seems reasonable given GB% has a year to year correlation of .807, statisitically significant, indicating it is repeatable skill.(Source, also click for explanation of correlation if your fuzzy on it).

Further influencing the degree to which BABIP plays a part in ERA are the skill sets of K/batter and BB/batter, which carry year to year correlations of .790 and .676 respectively (Source). These two skill sets are statstically significant and again indicate that their outcome is based on the pitchers skill. To the extent to which a pitcher limits balls in play by walking batters and striking out batters, he influence the amount of luck that will enter into his ERA. This is all the more reason why the aforementioned means of analysis (support neutral wins and losses, defensive independent pitching statistics, etc.) are important and valuable. Predictability is ideal for a franchise in evaluating a player, because they want to know ahead of time how a player will not only perform next season, but in seasons multiple years into the future, or whether past performances have been the result of skill or luck. Understanding, for instance, that ground-ball pitchersare overvalued in their ERA numbers because more unearned runs score when groundball pitchers are on the mound than do fly-ball pitchers is very important. Why? Because, as mentioned earlier, at the end of the game, they don’t subtract UER from the total score to determine the winner. We hope we demonstrated that so much of what goes into turning out an ERA does not accurately reflect the performance skill of a pitcher. Much of what ERA reports is context dependent on the “type” of pitcher, the defense backing him, the skill of the bull pen, and a measurable degree of luck; making ERA uninformative and often misleading. Support-neutral and Defense-independent statistics do a better job of capturing what is really happening on the baseball diamond -- something that ERA cannot do.

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Baseball Knowledge 101 - Wins (Suck)

We’re tackling Wins as our first stop in Baseball Knowledge 101. We had planned on including the full line from the syllabus: “Wins, ERA, and Rate Stats,” but quickly realized that these could get ugly and dense due to the quality and depth we wish to treat each subject with. So addendum one to the syllabus finds “Wins, ERA, and Rate Stats,” into two separate articles: “Wins (Suck)” and “ERA and Rate Stats”

Traditional pitching statistics are pretty much useless when it comes to evaluating and helping us predict the performance of a pitcher – especially wins. To begin, let’s take a more detailed look at what goes into making a pitcher successful in the first place. The pitcher is one of nine defensive players on the field. He is responsible for starting play by standing 60 ft. 6 in. away from the batter and delivering the ball to him. His goal is to get the batter out. He can throw strikes that are actually strikes, but his movement or speed fool the hitter into missing the strike. He can throw a strike that isn’t a strike, but again, his movement could fool the hitter or it could be a deceptive arm-angle that fools the hitter. The hitter could take the pitch that pitcher pitched and put it in play. The hitter might get good contact through a variety of variables all coming together and he could hit a solid line drive through the gap and notch a double. Perhaps on that play though, the center fielder had cheated just a little and was able to make a Sports Center worthy diving catch to make the ball put in play, an out. Of course the hitter could have just meekly grounded to the SS, resulting in an easy 6-3 ground out. Yet, the SS could have a momentary lapse in concentration, perhaps he’s having marital problems or just really has to pee, and as a result of whatever is on his mind, he bobbles the ball and the meek ground ball turns into an E6. The pitcher, in the opinion of the official scorer, probably earned an on that batter, but because the SS had to pee, now has no outs, and a runner on first base.

I’m not going to go back and count, but there are a lot of variables that going into a pitcher getting a single batter out. A lot of which end as soon as the pitcher releases the ball from his hands. So it makes little sense that we put so much stock into a pitcher’s W-L record. Just last year, the Cy-Young race was just as controversial as a West African presidential election, because 20 game winner Josh Beckett trumped 19 game winner CC Sabathia. In 241 IP Sabathia struck out 209 while only walking 37. He was responsible for almost a 1/3 of all of his outs. Beckett threw 200.7 IP Beckett struck out 194 batters while walking 40. Again responsible for about 1/3 of his outs. The difference I instantly see is that Sabathia and Beckett were clearly two of the best in the business, yet the Red Sox had to use a lesser bull pen arm in 40.3 innings more then the Indians did. Sabathia is more valuable than Beckett in those terms alone. Yet, pundits everywhere were crying afoul because of that one win that separated them.

So what goes into to a pitcher winning a game? Well, take that first paragraph and multiply it up to as many as 50 times. Only sprinkle in fatigue for the pitcher and the ability of the hitter to better recognize a pitcher’s guile as the game progresses. Also, you have to have your team score more runs than the other team, before you exit the game, and then trust your lead in the hands as up to as many as five different relievers – other wise you’re heading for a no decision. In that exercise, how much responsibility does a pitcher have for a win? Especially the run-scoring for the two AL pitchers who never hit. Well, in 2007 Sabathia’s Indians provided him 5.10 Runs/9 in his starts. That’s not how many runs that got in the innings while he the pitcher of records, but it’s a best I can do. Josh Beckett, of 20 Win glory, had 6.42 Runs/9 in his starts from the Red Sox. Meaning that Beckett didn’t even have to be as good to earn a win as Sabathia did, but he could only muster one more win.

This doesn’t even to begin to say who had the better bullpen support. We’ll skip the nuances of measuring that for now, but it’s pretty straight forward. How many times can we recall Oscar Villareal blowing a lead this year? Or remember the time when Wesley Wright came in a game with 3 on and 1 out, but got us out of the inning with only one run given up? He converted a 2.42 Run Expectancy into a 1 run performance and saved 1.42 runs from scoring. Those 1.42 runs weren’t even his responsibility, but he saved them anyway. That’s the level of inane-ness that evaluating starting pitchers on wins is provided when you focus it through the lens of bull-pen support.

So a Win is certainly a very poor measure of how to evaluate a pitcher. I believe I’ve made a case for it, and I hope it makes sense to you. So how then do we then measure a pitcher’s performance if Wins an inept tool? To that effect, a very valid tool developed by Baseball Prospectus is the Support-Neutral Statistics. “The Support-Neutral name comes from the fact that [Baseball Prospectus] is removing, or neutralizing, the variability of different levels of run support and bull-pen support...This gives a truer sense of how well a pitcher performed, without the distortions of offensive and defensive support.” (Baseball Between the Numbers: Why Everything You Know about the Game is Wrong, 2007 pg. 52). It works like this: say Roger Clemens went 7 IP of shut out baseball, BPro would then take that performance and assign it to a hypothetical league-average team and see how many times a league average team would win given that performance. It turns out, that is 85% of the time. So Roger Clemens earns .85 SNW and .15 of a SNL. These are the same things as the E(W) we presented in our statistical recaps earlier this year. While they are not the perfect tool for analyzing a pitcher’s performance, they certainly come closer to analyzing how much of a pitcher’s performance went into earning a win. Even there though, there are limitations. These will be discussed in DIPS, LIPS, and FIP section.

So, 7IP of shut out baseball is actually worth about .85 of win, if we exclude defense backing the pitcher from this analysis. Now, I think every Astros fans can hearken back to 2005, when Roger Clemens went 13-8 on the strength of a 1.87 ERA. How could he have possibly gone 13-8 with that ERA? Because the Astros only averaged 3.43 Runs/9 in his starts. Roger Clemens missed out on the Cy-Young that year, in spite of the fact that he was clearly the best pitcher in baseball, because he was deficient in an asinine and almost entirely luck based statistic. So the next time you here Steve Philips, Joe Morgan, or Ed Wade talking about how many decisions a pitcher has won as a basis for defending an acquisition, you should bristle with indignation. If that’s the only good thing they can say about a pitcher, then they’re telling you he’s effectively worthless, but he sure did get a lot help from the bats and gloves backing him. Just to make it concrete. Knowing a pitcher’s winning percentage has a year to year correlation of .202 in predicting his future performance. For those of you have forgotten your Stats 101 (I had to Wikipedia it so don’t feel too bad) Correlation measures the linear relationship between two variables. In this case Win percentage one year, to the next. Correlation coefficients range from -1 to 1. -1 means that there is an opposite relationship, high one year predicts low the next year. 0 means the two variables are completely unrelated and knowing one tells you nothing about the others. 1 means that there is a lot of stability in predicting the variable from year to year, given the first (click the .202 link for better explanation then what I just paraphrased). In general Correlation co-efficient less than .3 any direction are weak and pretty meaningless. .7 marks the statistically significant level, but that won’t be important until later.

Next time (when we look at pitchers again), we’ll look at ERA and how valuable of a tool it is or is not at determining a pitchers performance and why looking at a pitcher’s rates stats paints a much better picture.

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Baseball Knowledge 101 - Introduction and Syllabus

Believe me, we could keep producing snarky comments about beat writers and Astros management for a long time -- late Septemeberish to be exact. Instead, we’ve decided we’d like to do something a little more productive. Something that, hopefully, will make your readership of this humble little blog all the more enjoyable.

Evan and I first were introduced sabermetrics and different ways of viewing the game like a lot of people our age: Moneyball. However, for us, Moneyball merely whet our appetite for “baseball knowledge” as it only talked about the sabermetric concepts employed by the A’s in their quest to succeed on a small budget. For myself, I consider that book to be life changing -- which I know is extremely sad, but what it did for me was take me from casual observer of the game of baseball to someone who appreciated the art form of winning baseball on an entirely different level. The nuances of which I’ve come to find so fascinating I had to blog about it.

While it allowed to us to think about the game differently, we still struggled to grasp how to think beyond those basic concepts or truly employ them in our observation of the game. This quest for deeper understanding lead us to the internet. We soon discovered sites like The Hardball Times, Baseball Prospectus, and Tom Tango’s personal site. We then found ourselves right in the thick of where a great deal of sabermetric thinking was formulated and expounded upon for the last decade plus. In an effort to better understand some of the complicated mathematical and often economic analysis, I even took a few college courses specifically to enhance my ability to employ sabermetric analysis. Again, sad. Once school was out last year, I picked up a copy of Baseball Prospectus’ Baseball Between the Numbers: Why Everything You Know About the Game is Wrong. I’ll be the first to admit that in parts, it was like reading a college text book, but overall, it was easily accessible, well paced, and it completely changed how I thought about the game. Evan, to whom I’d report to on the brilliant and insightful ways to think about baseball from the book, eventually picked up his own copy.

The rest of the summer was spent emailing articles we found archived on sites back and forth and trying to play catch-up on the bounty of baseball knowledge available to us. While we had briefly tried our hand blogging during our baby steps in baseball analysis, we pretty much put it on hold as we dug deeper into the wealth of knowledge sabermetrics provided us. During the waning months of the season, the post season, and the entire off season pretty much the only dialogue between us was applying our new found baseball knowledge to the game and the wheelings and dealings between teams during the off-season.

After pestering another Astros blogger for sometime with our pious indictments of this opinion or that (which have since proved dutifully flawed because of our subjective bias, more on that at th end), we eventually picked up the blogging torch again in attempt inspire Astros fans to think about their hometown heroes in a different, more objective light. We’ve found a lot of the responses to the stat laden posts to be rather tepid and we fear it might because we’ve gotten ahead of ourselves. In an effort enhance the insight with which we are trying to provide you, our reader, we are going to try a weekly(ish) serious of installments walking you through the same inquiries we made into baseball and the knowledge they yielded. You should think of them as essay’s almost, as we’ll provide all the research and attempt to summarize and analyze them for you. Our hope is that we can open up the slowly growing readership we have developed to the ways that we have come think about the game of baseball.

To start, it’s probably necessary to briefly define sabermetrics and explain what it aims to do. The best definition I found with a quick Google search came from Wikipedia:

"Sabermetrics is the analysis of baseball through objective evidence, especially baseball statistics. The term is derived from the acronym SABR, which stands for the Society for American Baseball Research. It was coined by Bill James, who was among its first proponents and has long been its most prominent and public advocate.

From David Grabiner's Sabermetric Manifesto:

Bill James defined sabermetrics as "the search for objective knowledge about baseball." Thus, sabermetrics attempts to answer objective questions about baseball, such as "which player on the Red Sox contributed the most to the team's offense?" or "How many home runs will Ken Griffey, Jr. hit next year?" It cannot deal with the subjective judgments which are also important to the game, such as "Who is your favorite player?"[1]

It may, however, attempt to settle questions such as "Was Willie Mays faster than Mickey Mantle?" by establishing several possible parameters for examining speed in objective studies (how many triples each man hit, how many bases each man stole, how many times was he caught stealing) and then reaching a tentative conclusion on the basis of these individual studies.

That gets us close to what I have come to regard what sabermetrics does. Its benefit, in my mind, is its ability to answer objective questions by providing the inquirer with facts. It allows you to say whether or not a team should search out someone with a good batting average vs. someone with a average batting average, but superior on-base percentage because you can test the correlation to run production between the two. It allows for analysts to test strategies in baseball by determining the cost/benefit of different strategies (like sac bunts, stolen bases, IBB, etc.) in different game states. It can’t provide definitive answers, but it can help point you to the “truest” answer because it objectively provides the facts. Like all objective inquiries and the test surrounding them, sabermetrics, at most, provides support for a hypothesis, not concrete answers. Akin to a peer-reviewed journal, there is a lot of testing of findings and from those tests, the nuances of the truth are uncovered.

As we paint the picture of what we have come to understand about how to better analyze baseball, we encourage you to get hands on with the sources we cite. Over the last 18 months, Evan and I have read a lot of argument, counter argument in formulating our knowledge and we hope to boil that process down for you. However, we don’t want to be thought as presenting the truth about subject X or subject Y. These articles are to serve as a guide to getting your feet wet in the sabermetric world, not a cliff notes for baseball knowledge. We hope you’ll enjoy our offering of the next few weeks and further more we hope that you’ll engage in the information.

In the end, we hope that if we can open up or readership to the concepts we so love to employ in baseball analysis so that we can all keep each other honest. As I stated earlier sabermetrics provides objective answers to objective questions, however if one subjects the objectivity to biases, then often times you weaken the tool. I myself am guilty as charged. On May 13th I looked deeper into the Astros stats to see if their lightening hot streak was legitimate or not. Because I so desperately wanted the answer to be yes, I did a poor job of interpreting the numbers. The best face saving I could bring myself to do came on May 27th, and even then I couldn’t bring myself to say that the numbers indicated that our streak was based on luck and that the numbers pointed to a crash burn. In the end, we hope that this exercise will force us to be more honest with ourselves before we report on the Astros, or enable you to call us on any BSing we try to put forth.

Look for us to alternate between pitching and hitting before we jump to fielding, but here is a tenative syllabus of what we hope to accomplish:

Pitching Stats
-W, ERA, and Rate Stats
-DIPS, LIPS, FIP
-Relievers
-Pitch/fx and the next frontier

Hitting Stats
-BA, RBI, R, OBP, OPS
-BaseRuns, RC, etc.
-Line-ups and Protection
-Batter/Pitcher match-ups and other splits

Fielding Metrics
-Fielding percentage, and the rest

Putting it Together

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John Kerry Ain't Got Nothin' on Richard Justice - Why Sports Writers Matter

As I sat bleary eyed at my kitchen table, having hit the snooze button three times this morning, I began my typical morning trudge through the Chronicle’s Sports section. Usually, in such a state, I just mutter obscenity laden curses to Richard Justice and Steve Campbell. This isn’t because I’m angry at the world entirely at 6:30 AM, in the end, it’s because I know they have journalistic responsibility to educate the fans of Houston’s sport franchises and when it comes to the Astros, they’re pretty awful at their jobs. Justice and Campbell both have spent the last month-ish trying to explain why the Astros don’t need a fire sale in order to be a better team. That they’re just a FA pitcher next season away from the play-offs. That we can’t underestimate this team because one time, in 2005, they did something spectacular. Never mind that only a handful of those men are left in the Astros dugout, this team might just still have something up its sleeve. All we need to do, Justice and Campbell have urged, is just trust in Drayton.

Then, Ed Wade makes a move that signals to the entire baseball world that he and Drayton McLane are prepared to run this ship into the ground before they even think about trying that rebuilding thing and suddenly Richard Justice, this morning, thinks this organization is doomed. That’s quite the turn around don’t you think? Richard Justice went from a don’t give up on this team, it’s a free agent pitcher away from glory, company line guy to this guy overnight:

"Maybe McLane lacks patience. Maybe he still thinks there’s a quick fix out there.

That might be why he’s willing to spend $100 million on Carlos Lee and veto $1.2 million in spending on three draft picks.

If he’s really smart, he’ll realize he could save money by splurging on draft picks and cutting corners on Wolf, Shawn Chacon, etc.

When he finally understands this, when he studies how the Twins and Marlins and A’s have succeeded on dramatically smaller budgets, he’ll understand that less might actually be more."

Where did that come from Richard? Either you finally grew a pair or you truly are just the most easily swayed flip-flopper around. I hope it’s the former, because that means the pair will stick around and perhaps do something to influence the taste and preferences of Astros fans. If we had legion of beat writers condemning the fool-hearted arrogance of our owner and the ineptitude he inspires in our management, then perhaps fans would be not just be accepting, but welcoming of a rebuild. They might want to tune into Hooks and Express games that show up on FSN about once a week. If Richard Justice had parted with the company line a month ago and printed those statements, Astros fans as a collective body, might have been screaming for anything not buckled down to be moved or at least the pieces that could fetch something of worth.

Instead of rebuilding the farm system, like the smart organizations (Justice’s own words), a month ago this was Richard’s proposal for how to fix this team:

“This course has its price. Signing premier free agents [pitchers] will cost the Astros the draft choices they need.

But there's no perfect solution for a franchise that's broken in so many areas.

It's just one way out. Maybe the best way” (emphasis added).

I’ve read a few articles recently about the biggest villains in baseball, the owners, and that’s probably well and true in most cases. It's hard for anyone to stand up against monopolists with government protection. However, I have a bone to pick with our beat writers. It’s their responsibility to inform the fans of what’s going on in an organization, to help drive the taste and preferences of the general public. If you believe any part of how a market economy works, then you probably understand that taste and preferences are the most important part of demand and to that end, the beat writers may just be the most important aspect of shaping our demand for sports franchises. With this great responsibility, they have failed to do anything other then repackage hokey and tired company lines about this and that in order to get everyone to believe that this franchise isn’t busted. Instead of inciting a riot, they’ve tried to continue to pull the wool over our eyes. Now that the cat is out of the bag, they’re changing their tune -- it’s too little, too late.

There is a lot of blame to go around in baseball when things aren’t going right. I think Drayton and his front office deserve and hearty portion of it. Yet, as demonized as we can make those men and Union Station, we shouldn’t forget that there were a select group of men who had the freedom to say anything they wanted and have it read by millions of readers each day who stood by the dopes at Texas and Crawford instead of living up to their responsibility.

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Trades, Pads and Compensatory Picks

Tumbleweeds rolling, crickets chirping, Ed Wade bringing in an average at best starting pitcher. As Astros fans, we seem to be in a lose-lose situation. If management does do something, odds are it will be poorly conceived and cost the team money. If management does nothing in the next week, the team will have bypassed another good opportunity to strengthen our minor league system.

When this team was constructed, there were holes in the lineup and the starting rotation. If the Astros can’t get through the end of July without scrounging for bullpen help, the efforts Wade went through to create a new team this past off-season was all for naught. Trading away much of your bullpen from last year for an entirely new crop may have been the right move. Chad Qualls in essence yielded Jose Valverde, who despite Monday's debacle, has pitched well as the closer. When Dan Wheeler was sent to Tampa Bay, Ty Wigginton came in return and has played more than adequately, to the tune of an OPS+ of 113. He has helped to solidify a position that would have seen a Mark Loretta and Geoff Blum platoon day in and day out; negating two more chips to trade with. Michael Bourn has struggled, yes, but trading Brad Lidge to Philadelphia was the right move because despite having the break on his slider return to pre-2006 levels, the fact remains that every piece of that deal that came to Houston has been used. Geoff Geary has been a more than serviceable arm for the bullpen, and Mike Costanzo was sent to Baltimore in the Miguel Tejada trade. Michael Bourn is who he is: a speedster who has trouble getting on base. I know that is a strong indictment against a table setter, but until Bourn has 600 AB’s under his major league belt, I won’t completely dismiss his ability to be a competent player on this level.

While he has done just about everything he possibly could with the roster, farm system and owner he was given, I’d like to know what kind of GM Wade really is. He came to Houston as the man who drafted Jimmy Rollins, Chase Utley, Ryan Howard and Cole Hamels. But, what sort of stimuli does he respond to when the deadline approaches? This is a question that we baseball outsiders will probably never able to answer, as we aren’t privy to the information necessary to arrive at any conclusions. No question though, this will be the time that Ed Wade can define his first year as the Astros GM. As it stands right now, I doubt that he will be able to land another relief pitcher. Teams that are in contention have both greater needs and greater resources (i.e.- farm systems) by which to acquire players.

Stephen and I are were both under the assumption that Wade was looking to the future, despite the comments he’d given to the media in the past few weeks. Then yesterday happened. The only benefit I can see from this trade is that maybe Randy Wolf can put together a solid second half and qualify himself as a Level “B” free agent, thus giving the Astros another draft pick next year. If not, millions of dollars will have been in essence wasted. Jack Cassel could very well provide the same amount of success in the second half as Randy Wolf. Cassell has a very high HR/FB ratio, which should come down some in the second half if he pitches enough innings for the regression to the mean to occur. This is based of his 2007 season, in which he pitching sparingly, and like Wolf, luckily for the Padres. Wolf, as Stephen mentioned yesterday, has been unlukcy with his LOB%, but very fortunate in other categories. Moving from PETCO Park, which is an extreme pitcher’s park, to Minute Maid, which is neutral as far altering the runs scored/prevented in a game, should stand to bring him back to earth. There’s still more than a week left until the non-waiver trade deadline passes by, but Ed Wade’s first move is a head scratcher for sure.

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Astros become Wolf's Pack

**UPDATE** Stephen here, glad to be back. Evan and I just got off a "conference call" and have changed our tune about the trade. My initial reaction to this trade came through a series of text messages with Evan while I was on the home stretch of a 10,000 page document review (yes, it's as arduous as it sounds). Wolf's ERA had escaped me, but I knew the strike outs were there. Having arrived home, I finally got to sit down and crunch this trade around in my head.

I went to The Hardball Times' stat page and pulled up Wolf's numbers. He's been an unlucky pitcher in terms of LOB% which, and has an FIP (fielding independent) ERA of 4.29, and perhaps we could expect Wolf to improve as the season goes on.

The inquiry didn't stop there however, as Evan and I had bounced around, via text messages, what we thought of the Pet Co. park factor in Wolf's season might be on our respective commutes home. What I dug up shatters Evan's and my initial reactions to this deal. Wolf is sporting a 6.63 ERA away from Pet Co. this year. Meaning, that Wolf will most likely be demolished in the friendly confines of MMP a la his predcesor Woody Williams, who was equally bolstered by the fact that balls have to really work to get get anywhere it Pet Co. before migrating to Houston.

To depress myself further, I watched an Ed Wade interview in regards to the trade. I have officially lost all faith in this organization. Seriously, listening to him talk about how he thinks we can still pull it out, despite having when 42+ games in the last 60 to have a chance made me want to cry. How does this man have a job? How does this man not take the time to look at simple things like Home/Spilts, park factors, etc. before making a deal. The Astros have essentially made a deal that continues to leave them dead in the water as far as doing anything to make this a worthwhile ball club. Drayton's leadership, his choice in management, and his never give up attitude will leave an indelible and painful mark on this club for many, many years. We are completely F$%^ed is all I have to say.

We hereby rescind the following comments.


I hate myself for the title, but I couldn't resist. The Astros have acquired veteran right handed starter Randy Wolf for minor league pitcher Chad Reineke. My initial reaction was frustration, but then after looking at the logistics of the deal, I realized that if and when the Astros do not re-sign Wolf at the end of this season, a compensation pick is headed our way. The Astros will pay a pro-rated portion of Wolf's salary, plus a bonus of $175,000 for for every start he makes up to his 30th start. What to take from this trade? Ed Wade convinced Drayton McLane to take on the contract of a pitcher who can help this season by filling in for Roy Oswalt while he's out and then taking the spot of Jack Cassell or Runelvys Hernandez once Roy returns. For having paid just over $3 million for his services, the Astros will be given a compensatory draft pick in the 2009 draft. Reineke was not thought of as much of a prospect, although he did earn the distinction of having the best slider of any Astros farmhand in 2007. As it stands now, this deal get the Dome-Dogs seal of approval.

Here is a link to a prior post of ours detailing what goes into determining whether a free agent qualifies their old club for compensation picks, if said free agent fails to re-sign. Good stuff to know for the next week, because every the mouth of every analyst is going to be brimming with this sort of talk like he's Mt. St. Helen's.

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Unfounded optimism?

At the beginning of the season, I was asked by the creator of another blog to preview the 2008 Astros. Now, I will readily admit I am an unabashed homer- as much as I am rational about other teams, when it comes to my team, a group of 25 chimps could win at least 70 games. That's just how I am. Cutting to the chase, I predicted the Astros would win somewhere around 83 games. Sure, the rotation was poor, but our bullpen was much improved, our offense had a new SS and a catcher who could hit. A rebound year from Lance Berkman was in the cards as well. My analysis came to fruition about Lancelot, but I swung and missed on the others. It's fair to say that JR Towles' AB with the bases loaded yesterday against Dempster was emblematic of my prognostications.

There are many ways to win a baseball game, and even more ways to build the team that wins and looses games. Currently, I'm reading a book called, The Book On The Book: A Landmark Inquiry into Which Strategies in the Modern Game Actually Work. For anyone who's interested in picking up where books like Moneyball left off, this is the book for you. There is a section that deals soley with moves that a GM makes, specifically- what approach to building a team has proved to be the most successful? I won't get into the minutia of the chapter, but generally speaking, there are a few ways most teams are constructed in terms of dollars spent in a particular area: pitching/rotation, a balanced team that has no more than 25% of their total team payroll in any one of the categories, heart of the order (proportionately high (39% of payroll or more) amount of dollars spent on 3-4-5 hitters), up the middle (more than 25% of total payroll spent on catcher, 2B, SS, CF), and teams that build around one star player who makes an inordinate amount of salary. The following chart displays the success rate of teams from 1999-2004 that have implemented the aforementioned team building techniques:

Rotation-pitching combo (emphasis on starting rotation and bullpen).........(.540)

Balanced teams..............................................................(.509)

Pitching (not rotation).....................................................(.508)

Rotation only...............................................................(.501)

Borrowers (teams that "borrowed" salary $ from one area for use in another)..(.496)

Middle Defense..............................................................(.489)

Heart of the Order..........................................................(.460)

Star Teams..................................................................(.457)

So, the old adage of "you can never have too much pitching" obviously holds true. We didn't need this book to tell us that, but it's nice to have it in writing. So, where do our boys stand? Cot's Baseball Contracts have the Astros at an Opening Day Payroll of $88,930,414. Taking into account all of our salary obligations, the Astros are a Heart of the Order team. Lance, Carlos and Miggy will make $39.5 million this season, or 44.4% of total team salary obligations for 2008. Outside of Roy Oswalt's $13 million contract, the rest of our rotation (I used Brandon Backe, Brian Moehler, Chris Sampson and Wandy Rodriguez) boasts a combined payroll of $2.15 million. That's one thing if your team is using young studs just up from the minors, but it's an entirely different set of circumstances when your youngest starter is 29. What Wade attempted to do was borrow payroll expenditures from the starting rotation to create a bullpen that could compensate for a weak starting rotation. Jose Valverde ($4.7 million), Doug Brocail ($2.5), Geoff Geary ($1.125) and Oscar Villareal ($1) all have contracts that will pay out more money than any starter's other than Oswalt. Besides Villareal, I think it's fair to say that Wade's decision was wise in that he knew going in that a strong bullpen was needed in order for this team to compete. However, his willingness to completely disregard our need for a strong rotation was foolish.

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Platooning, Lampooning and Beermaking

Richie Sexson as the Yankees' first move pre-deadline?? In light of his .623 slugging percentage against lefties, I'd say a platoon at first base is in order for Big Sexy and the incumbant Jason Giambi, seen here explaining the statistical merits of a manager's leaving his starter in to pitch the eighth inning of a game over bringing in the set-up man. Breaking down the move statistically, Giambi has mashed against both lefties and righties, but with a batting average far lower than that of Sexson. That's all well and good, but Giambi gets on base at nearly the exact smae clip against lefties and he does against righties (.385 vs. .386 OBPs respectively). Just throwing that out there.

Platooning is something that used to be used with much more regularity before the 1990's. Teams have been forced to do away with platooning for myriad of reasons: the DH in the American league forces the manager in all probability to lose a position player. Increased reliance on the bullpen has caused pitching staffs to expand from the standard 10 used in the 1960s-80s to 11 and even 12. The Yankees are going to see if this retro move pays off.

Turnabout is fairplay

Just maybe the folks in Dallas are still upset about Giant fans mocking Tony Romo and Jessica Simpson.

Possible Jose Valverde Trade Destination: Milwaukee

The Brewers were mentioned as a landing point for Jose Valverde yesterday afternoon on SportsRadio 610. Here's the current stats of the Milwaukee pitching staff. I sorted it so that the pitchers who've pitched the most gaves (relievers) are at the top. Solomon Torres has done a respectable job in limited duty as the closer, but he is definitely not the power reliever that Jose Valverde is. Eric Gagne has been an unmitigated disaster for the Brewers, and I don't think that the team would hesitate to eat the remaining money on his contract by sitting him on the bench in crucial late game situations. After all, they've essentially signed CC Sabathia as a three month rental, with little hope of re-signing him. What could the Astros hope to land in return for their closer? Well, after Matt LaPorta was sent packing to Cleveland, the Brewers were still left with three top tier prospects. Mat Gamel is an interesting option. The Brewers minor league depth is well known, as is their desire to go for broke this season in order to try and make the playoffs. Could Ed Wade manage to make a move that involves Gamel, or a player of his caliber? I don't think he would be picky as to what kind of player, either pitcher or hitter, he would get in return for Valverde.

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Bring on part deux

Ok. The All Star Game was fun. AL wins again. Lance and Miggy do some damage. Awesome. Lidge and Wags give up the last two runs for the NL squad. Well, they once combined with four others to throw a no-hitter at Yankee Stadium, so they get a pass.

I just want the real games to resume.
I want to see if Lance can win the triple crown.
I want to see if Drayton gives Ed Wade the thumbs up to make a few trades.
I want Jason Castro to find success, and live up to the billing of a top draft pick.
I want the Astros be competitive, and make life difficult for the Cubs and Cards.
I want JR Towles to pull his average above that of a AAAA catcher. Ditto for Mike Bourn.
I want Roy O to bounce back after an injury plagued first half and produce like we know he's still capable of. I'm also gonna throw this out there: I can only speak for me, but if a contender offers Ed Wade a once in a lifetime package for Roy, I hope Wade thinks long and hard about the future of this team and sends Roy to a place where his talents can be maximized.
I want Wandy to pitch like it's put up or shut up time. Inconsistency does not become you, Mr. Rodriguez. The team needs to know if you're the kind of pitcher they should build around. Please prove that you are.

I also would like to see Milwaukee win the NL Central. That town hasn't made the playoffs in 26 years, and they've built a contender capable of ending that streak. A strong organizational wide commitment to building the farm system has allowed for a trade that's landed them an ace starting pitcher. If the Beer Makers' bats can produce a higher OBP, and their bullpen can stand firm, they have a good shot.

I'm all for the DBacks because:

1) I want to see Dan Haren and Brandon Webb pitch the first two games of a Divisional Round series. Then I want this guy to take the mound in game three.
2) The more teams with young talent that do well, the better. Earth to Drayton....
3) 18th inning magic, anyone?
4) I hope people clicked on that previous link and took a gander at those stats. They don't need Barry Bonds, right??

Let's go Rays: Gerry Hunsicker picked and moved across the gulf in 2004 and he's built a team that has strong Houston ties (Crawford and Kazmir are local products), and should be another example of how to build a club with some staying power. 2007 top pick David Price may be on his way up in the second half to shore up their pitching staff. Evan Longoria, BJ Upton and one of my second half sleepers, Carlos Pena, make a stout middle of the order for the Rays. Don't overlook their bullpen: comprised both of names we know: Percival, Wheeler and Miller, as well as names we don't: Balfour, and Howell.

Of course though, the Red Sawx and Yankees are in the hunt too. After the All Star festivities, I figure we've seen/heard/read enough about those teams to last us until the new Yankee Stadium closes down.

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All over the place

Stephen is out of town this week, so we're gonna have to rely on me to hold down the fort...wish me luck.

On a positive note, the Astros won their last series before the All Star Break by beating the Nationals in their series finale, 5-0. The news wasn't all good this weekend, however. Roy O was forced to miss his scheduled start on Friday, as he was experiencing continued pain in his hip abductor. The muscle is located on the outside portion of the hip, and controls leg movement away from his body. With the violence that goes into the mechanics of a major league pitcher's windup, one can see how important hip abductors are. (Here's an interesting breakdown of pitching phenom Tim Lincecum's mechanics. Often compared to Oswalt due to their similar stature, Lincecum has great mechanics which has translated into his being able to throw a baseball 98 mph while weighing in the 170's.)

Step in the right direction

Jason Castro has signed on to join the Astros organization. He will begin his career today, as he joins his Tri City (A) teammates in Rookie League play. What impressed me the most was that he is the second top ten pick to sign with the club that drafted him, and he had the least amount of time to do so, since he and his Stanford Cardinal were playing deep into the College World Series. He's slated to sign a deal that includes around a $ 2milllion dollar signing bonus (what most 10th picks get, give or take), and should be able to get a lot of time behind the plate this summer before playing winter ball after the major league season concludes.

HR Derby Tonight

An opportunity to cheer for Lance when he's on the national stage. Who does everyone think is gonna win? My heart obviously goes with the Big Puma, but this is the sort of exhibition that Josh Hamilton seems built for. That being said, I'm gonna go with the "out in left field" strategy and say Dan Uggla takes it home tonight.

Regardless of who wins, it's going to be a great two days for baseball. Wrigley and Fenway may be quaint, charming and all the rest of the platitudes one hears ad nauseum, but Yankee Stadium is special. I don't care if you hate the Yankees, the place has seen more historic moments occur on it's playing field than anywhere else. Yankee fans may be impatient and overly demanding, but they are also knowledgeable and reward winning play with seemingly unending adulation. (How else has Jeter made it through a season where he's OPS'ed .740?

Offensive Numbers (take that title however you'd like)

I think now is the best time to review the Astros' 2008 first half, starting with the offense. I'd like to compare where the players who have started the most games with the statistics PECOTA projected them to finish with. We'll leave the catcher position alone for now. Brad's projections take into account his being a backup, and JR Towles' projections take into account his not being completely overwhelmed by major league pitching. A fair evaluation of the number eight slot in the batting order wouldn't be possible, in other words. As usual, Baseball Prospectus is the source for all of our projections.

Michael Bourn (projected)--------5 HR-35 RBI-61 R-23 SB-.700 OPS
Michael Bourn (actual)-------4 HR-15 RBI-39 R-32 SB-.564 OPS

Kazuo Matsui (projected)---------5 HR-37 RBI-60 R-20 SB-.682 OPS
Kazuo Matsui (actual)-------1 HR-19 RBI-33 R-15 SB-.709 OPS

Lance Berkman (projected)--------30 HR-99 RBI-102 R-6 SB-.901 OPS
Lance Berkman (actual)------22 HR-73 RBI-79 R-15 SB-1.096 OPS

Carlos Lee (projected)-----------26 HR-98 RBI-89 R-12 SB-.849 OPS
Carlos Lee (actual)-----------21 HR-76 RBI-46 R-4 SB-.899 OPS

Miguel Tejada (projected)--------16 HR-79 RBI-78 R-4 SB-.796 OPS
Miguel Tejada (actual)-------10 HR-44 RBI-60 R-7 SB-.739 OPS

Ty Wigginton (projected)----------20 HR-74 RBI-63 R-4 SB-.813 OPS
Ty Wigginton (actual)---------8 HR-22 RBI-24 R-4 SB-.838 OPS

Hunter Pence (projected)----------25 HR-89 RBI-91 R-14 SB-.840 OPS
Hunter Pence (actual)---------12 HR-46 RBI-41 R-5 SB-.732 OPS

What to take from this? Lance and Carlos have played above and beyond their expectations. Lance especially, who's 90th percentile PECOTA projection (wherein a player plays to the top 10% of their ability in any given season) leaves him with "only" a .986 OPS. In other words: Lance is maxed-out. This is probably the best we'll see from Lance Berkman ever, but that's ok. These numbers are simply Bondsian.

Miguel and Hunter have slumped recently. Hunter has had adjustments made against him, and he is just now becoming more comfortable with laying off sliders in counts where he got fastballs in his rookie season. He had three extra base hits in his last two games, so hopefully he's going to come out of the gate hot in the second half. Tejada is not matching his PECOTA projection which is troubling, as he isn't supposed to start noticibly falling off until next year. True, this was supposed to be a year of decline, but not this much. His defense has been far better than expected.

Matsui and Wigginton have missed extended periods of time, but both have shown why they were made starters at the beginning of the season. Wigginton has been especially impressive, getting on base at a .368 clip at the bottom of the lineup. No wonder why he should be batting leadoff.....

Michael Bourn. Bourn, Michael. What can we say??? A .564 OPS isn't going to cut it. Among everyday NL OF's he is predictably last in that all important category. If ten runs equals a win, Bourn's batting leadoff instead of Wigginton/Loretta has almost certainly cost us a victory or two, or...don't make me go on.

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Examining the Wizard: Long Balls and Luck

**UPDATE - Links Fixed, I hate Blogger**

So I found another tool to throw at the Roy Oswalt mystery. It’s called Hit Tracker and it’s an incredible tool. Basically, it corrects for wind, atmospherics, and probably some more stuff, to say how far the ball would have traveled. It then categorizes HR by the following categories:

No Doubters - the HR cleared the fence by 20 vertical feet and landed at least 50 feet past the fence.

Just Enough - the HR cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet and landed less than once fence height length beyond the fence. It’s just snuck out.

Lucky - the HR wouldn’t have gotten out if it had been hit on 70 degree, calm day.

Plenty - Not a Just Enough or No Doubter HR.

So with that in mind, lets look at the 18 HR that Roy Oswalt has allowed, because, as we noted, he’s been especially unlucky with the HR ball this year. Given that we’re chalking some of this up to luck, we should expect him to have a fair amount of HR due to luck (i.e. Just Enoughs or Lucky HRs).

Just Enoughs: 3 HR

Plenty but Lucky: 2

Just Enoughs that were Lucky: 1

So, of the 18 HR balls that Roy Oswalt has surrendered, 6 could have just as easily stayed in the park if there was the slightest change in any variable. While this information doesn’t change the fact that Roy has struggled or explain why he has, it does provide credence to the idea that his HR/FB rate is inflated due to luck. Hopefully a Roy Oswalt with a healthy hip abductor and his luck/statistical randomness due to correct will emerge and be an effective Roy Oswalt in the 2nd Half. Perhaps one that decides to wave his no trade clause in the off-season and nets us some top prospects/major league ready players, too.

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It starts with a nibble

Contending teams have contacted the Astros about the opportunity to acquire Mark Loretta and Darin Erstad. I know, it's not much at this point, but depending on the prospects that are offered it would be pretty nice to get something for these two. Our other option is to keep them, and hope they become the type of Free Agents that are designated, "Type(s) A, B or C". Here's an explanation of this process:

Compensatory Picks - Round 1
A team that loses a free agent that is ranked as a Type A, B, or C player will receive a draft choice as compensation. Determining which ‘Type’ a free agent is based on a statistical system created by the Elias Sports Bureau that uses statistics based on a 2-year average for each of the positions. Salary Arbitration has to be offered to the player by the team before he signs elsewhere if they wish to receive compensation.

Type A Players: Ranks in the upper 30% of his respective position group
Type B Players: Ranks in the upper 50%, but not in the upper 30%, of his respective position group
Type C Players: Ranks in the upper 60%, but not in the upper 50%, of his respective position group
Source: mymlbdraft.com

The trade deadline is baseball's version of reality TV: backroom dealings, people's lives being changed right before our eyes and all the drama that goes along with it all. Stephen and I are very excited to keep up with and update the blog with every morsel of tasty rumor goodness.

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Enough is enough

This may be an unpopular topic. Team owners may cringe, old timers may scoff and children may run and hide, but someone has to write about it. Barry Bonds is out there waiting for a job. Not in the way that a 16 year old on summer vacaction looks for one- by lazily climbing out of bed and waiting for one to land in his lap while he watches Scrubs. Barry and his agent, Jeff Borris, have made it well known that he would like to play Major League Baseball again. Here's the catch though: despite being the All Time Homerun King (readers at home can add the optional * if you insist), Bonds has drawn less interest than a player such as Cliff Floyd. Now, nothing against Cliff- he has a World Series ring (Florida, 1997), and has compiled a nice career on a couple teams that have done some damage in the postseason. As much as I am continually delighted at the success of the Tampa Bay Rays, their adding of Floyd for the all important role of "Veteran Leader" seems to be the safest move they could have made. I mean, why alienate a growing fan base by bringing on one of the most polarizing figures of our time, sports or non sports? Winning, that's why. Barry Bonds, when he has even a little bit of talent around him, helps his team win games. The folks out in San Francisco may be happy that their clubhouse doesn't have Barry's personal recliner, his two lockers or the incessant media attention and inherent negativity that surrounds this man, but the fact of the matter is that he can play. Did it last year. Check it out. Sure, he's 43 and comes with the aforementioned baggage. Talent wins though. It has and will always give a team a better shot at winning. Veteran presence, a great clubhouse atmosphere, a bubbly, candid team full of good quotes and laughs may make you feel good about going out the park, but when it comes down to it, I want victories. An .897 PECOTA projected OPS from your DH would help in this regard.

That's all well and good though. The Rays are leading the AL East, and probably don't regret not having Barry Bonds on their team. Another division leader should though. The Arizona Diamondbacks are scuffling. 19-8 in April, 25-38 since then. The NL West has been disastrously bad. To the point, only the L.A. Dodgers have a winning record against another division ( 17-14 against the NL Central). Simply put, the D-Backs should have been able to run away and hide. This hasn't happened, and now their GM, Josh Byrnes, has apparently tossed Bonds' name into the ring for consideration to possibly replace an ailing (both physically and performance-wise) Eric Byrnes. Brynes is definitely one of those "clubhouse guys" who somehow managed to pull a career year out of thin air at age 31. If warning signs weren't all over this guy before that, his breakout season was barely above par, as he posted an OPS+ of 104. Solid year for sure, but probably doesn't justify the big contract he signed to re-up with the D-Backs in the offseason. This year, he's posted a .641 OPS, while being able to steal only 4 bases in 8 attempts. His .877% steal success rate in 2007 justified the risk of stealing, but obviously 4/8 won't cut it. He has a torn hamstring which probably has hampered his running game, which decreases his value tremendously. It's a wonder to me then, that it's taken the Diamondbacks this long to even consider Barry. Brynes' 10th percentile PECOTA prediction (the lowest rung on their prediction scale) had Byrnes at a .620 OPS, and a .225 BA. His Wins Above Replacement Level (WARP) is a predictably low 1.0. (Source: Baseball Prospectus). Bonds' 10th percentile WARP: 1.9. (Source: Baseball Prospectus). Even if Bonds performs as poorly as Byrnes, he still adds to the team win total. Barry has already said he will play for less than peanuts.All I can say is, forget public perception, play to win, and sign Barry. No matter what your Grandma thinks.

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Is Miguel Tejada Fatigued? Or Are We Just Lazy?

Earlier this week, I added to my list of things that Cecil Cooper has screwed up the fact that he just keeps playing Miguel Tejada all the time. It was an off the cuff reaction to what I was observing and reading. It might hold a grain of truth, but having looked into it further, I think that I might owe Cecil Cooper a semi-meaningful apology.

The impetus for this reflection came from Baseball Prospectus’ Marc Normandin, their fantasy expert, in an article in which he dissected anamolies in the SS market. Tejada has posted an ridiculous 25.3% LD rate through this point in the season. Given that LD% he should be sporting a .373 BABIP, which would put him back on the plain of his hot April start. The reason he hasn’t, is he is also meekly hitting 28.8% of his ball in play on the ground to his pull side, where, Normandin reports, he sports a .190 BA. My thoughts upon reading that, and Normandin even suggest to this to the reader too, was that he’s hitting so poorly due to fatigue. Which may still be true.
After mulling this over and trying to decide if my gut had been right earlier this week, I decided to look at his fielding stats (and no, not his Fielding Percentage) to see if he’s playing a lot worse because of his alleged fatigue. Towards the end of May, when I half-heartedly beat around the bush at saying that the Astros were due for a horrific collapse, Miguel Tejada was sporting a .873 RZR, good for 3rd in the NL among SS. This morning I decided to look at his RZR, simply as a means to confirm the Tejada fatigue theory. If it weren’t for the fact that I’d yet to finish my first cup of coffee, I would have been totally shocked, but he’s sporting a .872 RZR and leading all qualified NL SS. So where’s the fatigue?

In my humble opinion, the fatigue isn’t to blame -- though it may indeed be there. I think Tejada needs to make some sort of adjustment, however, in order to stay back on pitches so he stops taking 28.8% straight the opposing SS for a GIDP. If he can’t correct this, he needs to be slotted down in the line-up accordingly, because we can’t afford to have Berkman and Lee stranded because Miggy can’t swing the bat right now. The thing we all have to fear, is that Tejada has never sported such a high LD%, so if that deflates, we’re in serious trouble. It’s a little disappointing too, because how often do you hear of Player X and Y were taking extra BP or where in the cage trying make whatever adjustment to stay on their “A” game? I haven’t heard anything like that for Tejada and it’s frustrating that he gets to rest on the laurels of past performance instead of plow forward.

So Cecil Cooper, I’m sorry I unjustly accused you not understanding how to effectively manage Miguel Tejada’s playing time. But, I will still think you’re an idiot for keeping him in the “heart of the order.” So let’s work on that, please. While you’re at that, tell Tejada to get his jovial ass in the batting cage.

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